Published yesterday…an article I co-wrote with Tom Quiggin, the Canadian terrorism expert I mentioned recently in a blog.  He’s one of the key bloggers for Global Brief, a new (and the only!) Canadian foreign policy magazine.  They are so lucky to have him…the guy is brilliant and knowledgeable and gets the big picture.  To boot, he’s an amazing speaker.  I hope Washington figures out soon what a valuable asset he is, and tries to lure him away from Canada!

Debunking Terrorism Myths

by Tom Quiggin

Co-written with Janessa Gans

President Obama appears to have dropped the ill-fated phrase— “Global War on Terror”, and for good reason. Terrorism is not war, but a political act which seeks to instil a sense of fear, vulnerability and divisiveness in its targets. Terrorism is the methodology of the weak against the strong and its only effective weapon is fear. If the population refuses to be intimidated, then the terrorist campaign is ineffective.

Those who advocate the use of political violence (terrorists) are usually lacking in physical resources, personnel, and money. They also usually have weakly defined ideologies and objectives. The irony of this situation is that terrorists can only have “power” if we grant it to them. If we give into this fear (an an individual or nation), then we are submitting ourselves to the power of this fear.

When we see the bitter divisiveness and vicious partisanship in public debates over security issues, we can see that al Qaeda’s terrorism campaign is having its desired effects. Fear and a false sense of vulnerability are driving the discussions, not rational thought or strengths. It’s as if terrorists have already won!

Debunking myths is a first step to quelling fear and ignorance at home, which at the same time would go a long way to desiccating the fertile ground in which terrorism grows. Terrorism can only grow on fear; it cannot grow on knowledge.

Myth #1: Large numbers of Muslims are terrorists.
False. Not every Muslim in the world is a terrorist out to destroy the West and take down freedom and democracy with it. Most still envy and desire greater freedom and wealth. Only a tiny number, somewhat less than .001% of the entire Muslim population, are actually willing to undertake a life of terrorism.

Myth #2: al Qaeda is strong—and growing.
Does this group and its ideology pose an existential threat to our very existence as has been claimed? Or is it nothing more than two cranky old men in a compound somewhere along the Pakistan/Afghanistan border? In 2001, Al Qaeda had some 3,000 plus members operating in the relatively benign environment of Afghanistan. The organization paid salaries, travel costs and family benefits and enjoyed a relatively high degree of loyalty and cohesion across its membership. Now, the core group of Al Qaeda consists of a maximum of 300 individuals operating in a hostile environment. Finances are tight and vicious infighting is occurring among current and former top leaders as to how Al Qaeda should face its future. And the future is not bright. Terrorist campaigns start….and they end. We’ve seen senior and junior die-hard al Qaeda vets walk away from violence as a means of advancing “the cause.” Al Qaeda’s core group will have to face one of two realities. It will either have to walk away from the violent part of its self-limiting ideology, or face generational extinction as their anit-Soviet jihad era leadership expires or is killed off.

Myth #3: Terrorists are Islamic fundamentalists.
Actually, Muslim youth are vulnerable to radicalization precisely because of their lack of religious knowledge, not because of their religious upbringing.
One of the greatest myths about Al Qaeda is that it is “represents Islam” and the grievances it has are somehow religious in nature. In reality, the grievances and objectives of Al Qaeda are political and social. Various Islamic concepts such as takfirism, and al wala wal bara etc. have been twisted to provide justification for the killing of innocents. To be certain, various religious themes are also used in appeals for recruitment and financing (hijra, the umma). But strangely enough, if you actually read the written works of key Al Qaeda ideologues and examine their objectives, they are primarily political. The ideologues talk of revolutionary vanguards, colonial oppression, the control of economies and the need for the leadership to inspire a series of revolutions to establish a new reality. The ideology of Al Qaeda is clearly political and it uses the language of the extreme left to express itself. In fact, most of the effective terrorists produced or inspired by Al Qaeda have come from low practicing or non-practicing Muslim families. In general terms, they have had secular, technical educations and their functional families have provided them with stability as they get these educations. They are more Marx than they are Mohammed.

Myth #4: Terrorists are insane. Who else would kill innocent people or kill themselves?
False. Like terrorists in most groups, Al Qaeda’s attackers are not brainwashed, drugged or suffering from claims of insanity. They tend to be middle class or better, and are educated in technical subjects at secular schools. They do, however, have a rather fixed, rigid and uninformed world political view and they see themselves as the intellectual and physical vanguards for new generations of revolutionaries. They’re also not irrational. They pursue their methods because they have seen that such methods sometimes work.

Myth #5: Terrorism should be fought with military means.
This is where GWOT got it wrong. The military should actually play only a small role. The Washington based RAND Corporation did an extensive study on how terrorism campaigns end and they showed that military counter terrorism campaigns were effective about 7% of the time. The tried and true Cold War DIME approach is more applicable (Diplomacy, Intelligence, Ideology, Military, and Economic). The Cold War response used all the assets of the state to confront and prevail in the face of a determined, but weak, ideology. This is the type of response required now.

The Role of the Public
Perhaps the greatest myth of them all is that the public has little to do with the struggle against terrorism. For one, terrorist attacks are usually carried out on the public rather than the entity against whom the group perceives it is fighting. But the terrorist act itself does not shape the future. It is how we respond to that event that determines the outcome. If we choose to make our own response, according to our principles and norms, then it is we who determines what the future looks like. On the other hand, if we react to a terrorist attack with fear, as the terrorists wish us to do, then we are empowering them. Terrorism can only work if we react, rather than respond. A response grounded in reality rather than myths is the only way to be effective.

Janessa Gans strives to allay Western fear of the Middle East, and restore Arab trust in the West in the aftermath of 9/11. A former U.S. official, she served two years in Iraq, and has lived and worked extensively throughout the Middle East. Gans is the Founder and President of Euphrates Institute (EI), a non-governmental organization dedicated to improving relations between the Middle East and the West. EI inspires new solutions for the region through individual awareness, action, and peace to build bridges between the Middle East and West. Gans also taught Middle East studies at Principia College from 2007-2009, and has published over a dozen articles on Iraq and the Middle East, including in the Christian Science Monitor and the Los Angeles Times. She has been interviewed on national and international outlets, such as CBS, CNN, Radio Netherlands, American Public Media, and Democracy Now. Gans holds a Master’s degree in International Policy Studies from Stanford University and a Bachelor’s degree in International Relations from Principia College.